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Although the war in Liberia in July 2003 claimed hundreds of lives, the international 
community was reluctant to intervene.  In this article, the author debates the question: 
does international military intervention equal protection of populations?  The role of 
humanitarian organisations in military intervention is considered.  Aid organisations 
cannot call for deployment of a protection force without renouncing their autonomy or 
appealing to references outside their own practices.  Such organisations provide 
victims with vital assistance and contribute to ensuring that their fate becomes a stake 
in political debate by exposing the violence that engulfs them, without substituting their 
own voices for those of the victims.  The political content of humanitarian action is also 
outlined and military intervention in the context of genocide is discussed.  The author 
concludes that the latter is one of the rare situations in which humanitarian actors can 
consider calling for an armed intervention without renouncing their own logic.  
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Monrovia, July 2003: the fighting between forces loyal to President Charles Taylor and 
troops belonging to Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the 
country’s main rebel movement, had already claimed hundreds of civilian victims. 
Lacking running water, food and medical care, hundreds of thousands of Liberians 
sought refuge in the capital, where the terror induced by the hail of bullets and shells 
was exacerbated by the combatants’ propensity for the worst forms of violence. 
Malnutrition threatened and a cholera epidemic raged.  As so often in cities ravaged by 
war — Beirut, Mogadishu, Grozny — little help could be given.  The few operational 
humanitarian teams on the scene were confined to tending to those of the wounded who 
managed to reach them and, thanks to the courage of local staff, to providing basic 
assistance in the displaced persons’ camps. 
  While Britain opted for direct military action in Sierra Leone and France sent 
troops to Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, no foreign power seemed willing to commit troops to 
stop the carnage in Liberia.  Some humanitarian organisations were strongly critical of 
this abandonment and called for international intervention.  In France, Action Contre la 
Faim (ACF) settled for ‘deploring, once again, the international community’s criminal 
wait-and-see policy’
1 and condemned the ‘absence of any immediate and concrete 
measures to protect civilian populations living under threat of death’.
2   British and 
American organisations were more explicit.  The American Refugee Committee (ARC) 
urged President Bush to ‘use our military strength to help create and sustain peace in 
Liberia’.




West African troops were to be deployed but also asked the US to lead a multinational 
force.
4 
   Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) refused to endorse these appeals.  However, 
there was general outrage at the horror engulfing Liberia.  This feeling was all the more 
intense given the stark simplicity of the facts: Liberians were suffering from starvation 
and lack of medical attention, but above all from the unbridled violence of the 
combatants.  Should not a humanitarian organisation draw the obvious conclusion and 
call for armed intervention to protect them? 
The fog of war 
The question had arisen before, when Charles Taylor launched his insurrection against 
Samuel Doe’s bloody regime in December 1989, but the deployment of white helmets 
from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in August 1990 
had put an early end to that debate.  Concluding that Liberia was in the hands of 
‘contending factions which are holding the entire population hostage, depriving it of 
food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life’, ECOWAS had decided to 
send an intervention force (ECOMOG) ‘to stop the senseless killing of innocent 
civilians, nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their 
democratic institutions’.
5 
  These humanitarian considerations obscured the principal aim of the Nigerian-
sponsored operation, which was to prevent Charles Taylor from seizing power.  Shortly 
after their arrival, the West African troops began to support factions hostile to the rebel 
leader, thus at the last minute preventing his taking Monrovia.  They showed little 
interest in protecting civilians as fighting raged throughout the capital in August 1990, 
October 1992 and April 1996.  ECOMOG fought an all-out war against Taylor and, 
from 1992 to 1993, imposed an embargo on humanitarian aid to the rebel zones, 
shelling the convoys and warehouses of aid organisations (Jean, 1993).  Eventually, in 
1995, after pillaging Liberia and indulging in widespread violence, ECOMOG made a 
strategic U-turn and allowed Taylor to seize power in 1996, six years after it had 
snatched imminent victory from him. 
  This precedent did not mean that all future ‘protection’ operations were 
doomed to inflict damage on those they were supposed to help.  In Sierra Leone, the 
British government’s ‘ethical diplomacy’ ended the violence against a population that 
had been subjected to a particularly brutal war since 1991.  The 650 paratroopers who 
landed in May 2000 to support pro-government forces and the 11,000 UN blue helmets 
carried the war to the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), forcing them to 
sign and abide by a final peace agreement.  The only drawback was that peace had been 
imposed at a heavy price: willingness to overlook the war crimes committed by pro-
government forces, an embargo on aid to RUF zones and the transfer of the most 
intransigent combatants to Liberia, where some of them were encouraged to overthrow 
Charles Taylor (Weissman, 2004). 
  It is obvious from this brief summary that not everybody automatically 
accepts the equation ‘international military intervention equals protection of 
populations’.  Like any political enterprise, these operations produce winners and 
losers, a situation that also applies to non-combatants.  The precedents of Somalia and 
Bosnia are sadly revealing in this respect.  In Somalia, the US and UN troops, who 
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generalised famine and insecurity, proved incapable of protecting civilians, rapidly 
became parties to the conflict and were responsible for many acts of violence, including 
bombing of premises belonging to aid organisations, torturing and murdering non-
combatants and massacring civilians (Brauman, 1993).  In Bosnia, the populations who 
had believed the UN’s promises of protection and had taken refuge in the Zepa and 
Srebenica ‘security zones’ were deported and slaughtered while the blue helmets stood 
by and watched.
6 
  In other words, the call for armed intervention to defend the populations of 
Liberia is fraught with risk, to say the least.  Contrary to the claim made by the Irish 
relief organisation Concern, a claim which reflected the views of its pro-intervention 
counterparts, there was no unequivocal guarantee that a ‘rapid deployment [of a 
peacekeeping force] would prevent further unnecessary civilian deaths and allow 
agencies such as Concern to deliver badly needed humanitarian aid’.
7  Whether the 
‘problem solvers’ like it or not, there is no technical riposte to war crimes that will 
ensure that the populations we seek to help will actually receive protection and 
assistance.  Anyone who lives in the real world is familiar with the ‘unbridgeable gap 
between calculation and the manifold possibilities that make up reality’ (Terray, 2003: 
92), as well as with the uncertainties and dangers that accompany the exercise of 
power, particularly in time of war. 
  Perhaps a robust international policing operation will save the lives of many 
Liberians. Perhaps it will result in an upsurge of violence against civilians, false 
promises of protection and a growing confusion between intervention forces and aid 
workers who are judged to be complicit in the war crimes committed by the troops they 
have welcomed.  Perhaps pumping massive resources into Liberia, whether in the form 
of bilateral or other aid, would offer an alternative to the economy of predation that 
sustains the warlords and combatants and would thereby contribute to the pacification 
of the country.  Who knows?  Humanitarian workers can be no more certain of the 
outcome than the actors on the international and Liberian political stages.  But it is for 
the latter — governments, international institutions, political parties, think-tanks and 
citizens — to establish a position on such issues, to ‘cut through the fog of war’ 
(Terray, 2003), take the gamble and accept its consequences. 
The autonomy of the humanitarian approach 
In fact, gaining access to the battlefield and providing impartial assistance to non-
combatants, to whatever side they may belong, implies that humanitarians have 
relinquished the right to express opinions about the legitimacy of the war aims pursued 
by the belligerents.  There is no reason why an intervention conducted in the name of 
protecting civilians should constitute an exception to this rule.  Aid workers cannot be 
for or against making war on the Liberian factions in order to ‘protect civilian 
populations’ any more than they could be for or against the war started by the US to 
‘put an end to the suffering of the Iraqi people’.  This is an operational principle, a 
prerequisite that allows them to protect their neutrality and demand immunity from 
violence as they go about their relief work.  What argument could humanitarian actors 
fall back on when Liberian factions refuse them access to the zones they control on the 
grounds that aid agencies support the international forces attacking them? 
  Beyond this operational principle lies an even more fundamental reason that 




rests on a logic which is fundamentally distinct from the reasoning employed by 
supporters (or opponents) of the recourse to force.  Indeed, anyone who defends a 
political project — and especially a military undertaking — cannot avoid the following 
question: which citizens may live and which of them can or must die (Bradol, 2004)?  
In reality, the imposition of peace, like the creation of all political order on an 
international, national or local scale, inevitably generates its quota of ‘victims’; 
‘excluded’ and ‘powerless’ people who are either doomed to violent death or deprived 
of water, food, medical care and shelter — elements essential to their survival.  The 
Sierra Leoneans and Liberians sacrificed to the pacification of Sierra Leone, like the 
Afghan prisoners of war massacred during ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, are 
testimony to this process.  The logic of power either denies the existence of the people 
it has sentenced to death or justifies their sacrifice in the name of a ‘lasting peace’ and 
the well-being of the greatest number; thus, Lenin’s dictum ‘you can’t make an 
omelette without breaking eggs.’ 
  Humanitarian action, however, is precisely the ‘revolt of the eggs’ 
(Finkielfraut, 1996).  In our view, relief action is addressed as a priority to those who 
form ‘the silent residue of politics’,
8 the men and women whose very existence is 
called into question by the indifference or open hostility of their contemporaries. 
Adding speech to action, humanitarians challenge power by asking it if all the deaths it 
decrees or tolerates are legitimate.  Through aid and discourse, they dispute the logic 
that justifies the premature and avoidable death of a part of humanity in the name of a 
theoretical collective good.  By doing so, they mark out the limit beyond which the 
destruction of human life can no longer be perceived as necessary but must be regarded 
as a crime and a scandal. 
  In this sense, humanitarian actors have a duty to demand autonomy, a crucial 
separation from all forms of power and politics, however respectable they may be.  In 
the interests of consistency, they cannot both adopt and contest the logic of a power 
that imposes a choice between those who may live and those who must die.  Let us be 
clear that this is not a matter of defending a radical pacifism and even less about 
opposing the ‘cynicism of politics’ with ‘humanitarian virtues’.  We simply wish to 
stress that the two approaches are entirely separate and have everything to lose if they 
are confused.  The former is necessarily concerned with the resolution of conflicting 
interests and will produce losers among combatants and non-combatants alike.  The 
latter resolutely sides with the losers; it tries to save their lives and questions the 
reasons for their sacrifice. When seen from this angle, the call for armed intervention in 
Liberia amounts to renouncing the logic specific to humanitarian thought and action.  
Hubris and utopia 
Because aid workers are condemned by definition to a particular form of frustration — 
assisting the victims and exposing that the violence inflicted upon them does not bring 
about the end of that violence — they are strongly tempted by politics.  The slogan 
‘doctors cannot stop genocide’, launched by MSF in 1994 as part of the appeal for a 
war against the Rwandan militias who were pursuing a policy of extermination, can be 
adapted for any of the crises that are bathing the world in blood.  Doctors cannot stop 
the violence in Liberia or the destruction of the Chechen and Palestinian peoples any 
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Republic of Congo or Burundi.  This also applies to situations like the forced 
displacement of populations in Sudan and the recurrent famines in Ethiopia. 
  Now, if humanitarian action is not a response to war crimes, aid agencies 
cannot call for the deployment of a ‘protection’ force without renouncing their 
autonomy or appealing to references outside their practices.  Indeed, any campaign for 
armed intervention is a political act in its own right.  It entails expressing a view about 
the recourse to force — why it should be necessary in Liberia but not in Sudan or 
Chechnya, for example.  It also raises questions of an operational nature: Who are the 
targets of the intervention?  Who are its partners?  What price should be paid?  In 
Liberia, should the troops charged with the task interpose themselves between all the 
existing factions or should they take sides, as the UN and UK forces did in Sierra 
Leone?  Should the intervention force be composed exclusively of West African 
contingents?  Should the US, the European Union and other countries get involved? 
How many soldiers should they be prepared to sacrifice: ten, a hundred, a thousand? 
Should this force give priority to securing Monrovia, at the risk of displacing the 
fighting to the camps in the interior, or should it take possession of the entire country? 
If the latter hypothesis is favoured, do we then intend to place Liberia under UN 
trusteeship or turn it into a US or West African protectorate? 
  It is impossible to answer these questions without resorting to a political 
vision of the present and the future that substantially overrides the issue of protecting 
Liberian civilians.  This is an issue on which humanitarian organisations have 
diverging opinions.  It is rare for pro-intervention agencies to agree on the nature and 
composition of such a force.  In the Liberian case, every NGO had a preference, either 
for a UN intervention or a US and West African operation, yet none could say why this 
choice would have been in a better position to guarantee the security of the Liberian 
people, nor against whom and at what price it should fight.  All these considerations 
were brushed aside in the pressure to address a ‘humanitarian emergency’.  In the name 
of the suffering of the Liberian people, ARC stressed the need for unilateral action by 
Washington: ‘The administration should appoint a civilian humanitarian response 
coordinator to oversee relief efforts in Liberia. That way, humanitarian assistance will 
play a more significant role in the planning and execution of US involvement’.
9  Oxfam 
(UK), on the other hand, advocated the deployment of a multinational UN force that 
should nonetheless include a US element: Washington should issue a ‘concrete and 
non-negotiable timetable for its support for the deployment of peacekeepers to Liberia, 
including US troops’.
10 The Irish organisation Trocaire rejected the idea of US 
participation and favoured a strictly UN intervention in the light of the ‘critical 
importance of promoting multilateral approaches to global conflicts’.
11   These 
differences shatter the harmony of victim-centred rhetoric — and demonstrate that the 
call for armed intervention is a political affair par excellence — while the posture of 
infallibility that accompanies the adoption of ‘humanitarian’ positions remains intact. 
  Other organisations like ACF and MSF were more aware of the stakes 
involved in the call for military force and were not so reckless: they preferred to take 
refuge in utopian or consensual generalities.  In substance, they explicitly condemned 
the ‘lack of protection’ available to the populations of Liberia and the ‘inaction of the 
international community’.  Such a position implicitly demands the deployment of an 
international police force to protect Liberian civilians.  If we read between the lines, we 
can distinguish the call for a powerful and determined force to stand in the path of all 
war criminals, a force that rigidly adheres to the principles of International 




Geneva Conventions.  In other words, when faced with an emergency, these 
organisations fall back on utopian scenarios. 
  It is quite understandable that aid workers should feel frustrated over their 
humanitarian role in Liberia and seek the comfort of ideal solutions.  Deploring the 
‘lack of protection’ for civilians or calling upon the international community to 
shoulder its responsibilities allows them to believe they are breaking out of the confines 
of aid action.  Such rhetoric mimics the adoption of a political position which, because 
it is utopian, does not jeopardise their autonomy and eludes the dilemmas that 
accompany political action.  It does nothing to relieve the frustration, for everybody 
realises its futility given the urgency of stopping the carnage. 
The rehabilitation of politics: giving the powerless a voice 
In Liberia, as elsewhere, aid organisations can only do their best within the confines of 
their role, which consists of providing victims with vital assistance and contributing to 
ensuring that their fate becomes a stake in political debate by exposing the violence that 
engulfs them.  Humanitarian actors cannot supply answers but they are in a position to 
ask questions.  Obviously, no measures to address the crime will be undertaken if it is 
not named, if it is not made visible, and if the victims are concealed from their 
contemporaries.  Investing the intolerable with a political visibility and refuting the 
discourse that presents it as a ‘natural evil’ to which we should resign ourselves, are 
essential stages in the transformation of the unacceptable into a political problem that 
demands a political response. 
  In Liberia, this process of politicisation needs to begin by deconstructing the 
clichés that analyse the conflict in terms of ‘tribal savagery’, thus exonerating the West 
of all responsibility while exhorting it to keep the ‘new barbarians’ at a distance if they 
cannot be ‘civilised’ (Jézéquel, 2004).  But above all, the general public and those who 
condemned ‘the country’s abandonment by the international community’ should be 
reminded that this community has been in the business of intervention for some years. 
Indeed, destabilisation was the price Liberia paid for the pacification of Sierra Leone 
and the containment of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.  In order to put a stop to the 
depredations of armed groups backed by Charles Taylor in eastern Sierra Leone, south-
eastern Guinea and western Côte d’Ivoire, the neighbouring states and their 
international partners decided to carry the fight on to Liberian territory.  To this effect, 
they armed the two guerrilla groups who, along with Taylor's troops, were ravaging the 
country and reducing its population to slavery.
12  This regional policy was supported by 
the Security Council and Western powers,
13 which had plainly decided to drive out 
Taylor whatever the cost.  Although experts commissioned by the UN Security Council 
revealed the link between Guinean and Ivoirian authorities and the rebels, the Security 
Council enacted sanctions only against Taylor.  Moreover, at the very moment when 
peace talks between Liberian factions opened in Ghana in June 2003, David Crane, 
chief prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (and former director of national 
security at the Pentagon), decided to indict Taylor on the basis of his support for the 
RUF, a move which drove him back to Monrovia. ‘These negotiations can still move 
forward, but they must do so without the involvement of this indictee’,
14 Crane told the 
press, thus excluding an intractable interlocutor from the peace talks. 
  Britain (whose military advisers in Sierra Leone were in contact with LURD 
fighters),
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rebels) and France (which turned a blind eye to Ivoirian government support for the 
Liberian combatants) had obviously opted for war in Liberia.  Instead of calling for 
armed intervention or condemning the ‘inaction of the international community’, 
humanitarian organisations would have done better to confront the Security Council, 
France, Britain, the US, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire and ask them: as you have opted for 
a military solution in Liberia, what measures do you intend to take to relieve the 
suffering of the Liberian population, for which you are partly responsible?  What do 
you intend to do about the war crimes perpetrated by the forces you encouraged to 
overthrow Taylor? 
  It is essential that we draw public attention to the behaviour of the Liberian 
warlords — who all claim to be fighting for ‘democracy’ — and contrast it with the 
photographs of the inhabitants of Monrovia, decimated by cholera and indiscriminate 
gunfire, and the stories told by the people who managed to escape from Bong province, 
accounts of rape, torture, murder, looting and forced enrolment perpetrated by the 
‘freedom fighters’.  But it is equally important to expose the link between these tragic 
events and international management of the West African crisis.  Such a challenge, 
supported by objective and verifiable evidence, would have the merit of framing the 
debate in political rather than moral terms, and would not force humanitarian 
organisations into providing answers they are in no position to give.  Did the 
stabilisation of the Sierra Leonean and Ivoirian crises require the overthrow of the 
tyrannical but relatively stable Taylor regime at the risk of many civilian casualties? 
Perhaps it did, but that was not for aid workers to decide.  Whatever the case, the 
people who took the risk must take responsibility for the consequences.  In this respect 
humanitarians are entirely justified in asking what the belligerents and their foreign 
sponsors intend to do about the war crimes for which they bear varying degrees of 
responsibility.  It is the duty of aid agencies and other organisations to reveal the extent 
to which the current deployment of international forces is leading to a significant 
reduction in violence against civilians and to establish whether or not the promises of 
protection are effectively being kept. 
  Finally, reframing the political debate presupposes that humanitarian 
organisations stop acting as the voice of the victims.  An aid agency is often tempted to 
absorb the anguished cry of the populations it assists — reduced as they are to the 
status of animals that can only express suffering — and recycle it as a discourse that 
demonstrates a conception of what is just and what is unjust.  Although it is quite 
normal that humanitarians should point to perceived violations of the Geneva 
Conventions and turn them into a political issue, they still cannot substitute their own 
voices for those of the victims.  In accordance with the teaching of the philosopher 
Jacques Rancière, the task of humanitarian actors is to ‘reveal the formerly unseen’ 
(1995).  But they must also contribute to ensuring that what was ‘audible as a noise 
becomes audible as a discourse’.  In other words, they must break the symbolic order 
that relegates those damaged by politics to ‘the darkness of silence or the animal sound 
of voices expressing consent or suffering’.  To put it another way, when institutions 
like the UN Security Council approach aid organisations and ask what can be done for 
the Liberian people, these organisations would be better advised to refer them to the 
parties most affected by the conflict — the Liberians who have attempted to express 
their grievances, by piling up bodies in front of the US embassy in Monrovia, for 
example.  Victims’ protests should not be idealised as the reflection of an infallible 
truth; they should be accorded the same status as any other human being who is called 




  The political content of humanitarian action consists of the following duties: 
to remind states of their commitments and responsibilities; to challenge the ‘order of 
things’ by emphasising that it is also — and above all — the order of humanity; to 
remind the protagonists that they cannot support injustice while ignoring its 
consequences; to stress the historical contingency of the division between winners and 
losers, included and excluded, rich and poor; to help the powerless, the sacrificial 
victims of the production of the ‘order of things’ to express their concerns in the public 
arena.  These are the means by which humanitarian action can avoid the drift towards 
charity and transform pity into a demand for justice. 
The singularity of genocide 
Contrary to appearances, this minimalist but radical profession of faith is not a 
definitive condemnation of the appeal for armed force.  We believe there is at least one 
situation in which aid workers can call for military intervention: when they are 
confronted with genocide and consider that there is a realistic possibility of it being 
stopped by military action.  This exception involves a temporary renunciation of 
humanitarian logic and full participation in the political arena and is justified for at 
least two reasons.  First, because food and medical aid are of little use to civilians who 
have been marked out for extermination by a state that is mobilising all its forces to this 
end.  Second, because it is impossible to remain a humanitarian without taking sides in 
the event of genocide.  The crime’s singularity derives from the fact that the massacre 
of civilians is not regarded as a ‘military necessity’, a way of achieving a strategic 
advantage, but has become an end in itself, a project that requires the assiduous 
application of military strategy and logic.  Under these circumstances, emphasising the 
obligations to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and to preserve the 
lives of the latter amounts to taking a stand against a power that has resorted to arms 
purely in order to perpetrate genocide.  The principle that aid workers adhere to: the 
refusal to express a view on the legitimacy of war aims so they can relieve the suffering 
of all non-combatants, is rendered de facto null and void when the extermination of 
non-combatants is the precise goal pursued by one of the belligerents. 
   There is also a more opportunistic reason that justifies the call for military 
action in this particular case: the request for armed intervention against a genocidal 
power is simply a request that the law be applied.  Indeed, the 1948 Convention for the 
prevention and curtailment of the crime of genocide enjoins the 129 signatory states to 
take all appropriate measures, including military action.  In other words, by designating 
extreme violence as constitutive of genocide, the signatories are automatically 
committed to using all available means to combat those who organise, facilitate and 
perpetrate this crime against humanity.  
  The obligation to ‘put a stop’ to a particular crime is surely as political as it is 
judicial.  From a legal point of view, it also applies to ‘serious violations’ of 
International Humanitarian Law such as indiscriminate attacks on civilians and 
combatants.  But we are forced to accept that this prescription, set out in Article 89 of 
Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions 1977, does not carry the same moral, 
symbolic and political weight as the one established by the convention against 
genocide (although this was ratified by fewer states than Protocol 1 Additional, which 
was signed by 154 parties).  However, it is worth asking why the call for armed 
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massive war crimes inflicted with the aim of ‘cleansing’ territories or reducing 
populations to total submission, crimes so lethal that they can attain genocidal 
proportions (as in Timor, where the repressive policies of the Indonesian army led to 
the deaths of between 35 and 43 per cent of the population). 
  In fact, the singularity of genocide does not automatically resolve the question 
of armed intervention.  When should the organised destruction of civilian populations 
be classified as genocide?  When the victims are counted in tens, hundreds, thousands 
or hundreds of thousands?  Once again, prompt and carefully considered responses 
depend on independent political judgement.  They cannot be expected from local 
political protagonists who, in the hope of attracting the support of the international 
community, use the political and legal resources of the word genocide to tarnish their 
adversaries.  It is also dangerous to put one’s faith in international bodies like the UN 
Security Council, which refused to acknowledge the existence of genocide in Rwanda 
for more than six weeks because of the legal and political implications of such a 
qualification.  While autonomy is essential if the crime is to be given its proper name, it 
is no guarantee of clear-sightedness: it was some weeks before Médecins Sans 
Frontières teams working in Rwanda in April 1994 realised that the massacres they 
were witnessing were actually part of a genocidal process. 
  Last but not least, the call for military action to stop genocide, if it is to be 
anything other than a vain posturing designed to salve the consciences of aid workers, 
must be based on political and military assessments that clearly indicate that an armed 
intervention is not only necessary but also actually possible.  This is not always the 
case.  For example, can we imagine that aid organisations should have called for the 
US, which had barely emerged from the Vietnam War, to invade Cambodia in order to 
stop the Khmer Rouge killing machine? 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, there are only very few situations in which humanitarian actors can call 
for an armed intervention without renouncing to their own logic: when they are 
confronted with genocide or a process of organised destruction of civilian populations. 
Were we witnessing such a situation in Liberia?  MSF doesn’t think so.  The fighting 
that took place there in July 2003 may have been extremely violent but it was not 
driven by the dynamic of genocide.  We managed to save the lives of many people and 
our patients were not condemned to be murdered once they left our hospitals.  The 
genuine improvement in security conditions in Monrovia since the end of hostilities 
and the intervention by international forces does not weaken our position.  Because we 
refused to support the deployment of troops, we are able to acknowledge the limited 
but real benefits of their presence without being accused of partiality.  And today, we 
can refuse to be supervised by the peacekeeping authorities without being accused of 
incoherence. 
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trading, Arms-trading.  The new UN Resolution misses an opportunity to tackle the regional 
conflict from all sides.  Africa Confidential 44(10), 16 May 2003: 4–5, 8. 
13. Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 on Security Council 
Resolution 1,468 (2003), concerning Liberia (S/2003/498), 24 April 2003: 17, 30. 
14.  ‘Le President Libérien inculpé de crimes de guerre’ (trans. Liberia’s president charged with 
war crimes).  Libération, 5 June 2003. 
15.  These contacts were confirmed by many LURD fighters.  See Reno (2002: 64). 
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